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In 2003, the case of R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority1 dramatically brought into light the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 as outdated and inconsistent. Authorisations for saviour sibling 
treatment appeared futile as cases were decided illogically, leaving some patients 
having to seek treatment elsewhere. The procedure of pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis alongside tissue typing embryos has been a huge breakthrough in treating 
children born with serious life threatening diseases. However, this essentially 
unforeseen technology is poorly regulated in the 1990 Act and has therefore resulted 
in the new Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 which aims to make such 
legal rules regarding this kind of treatment both clear and concise. Whether this has 
been a success will be seen in time.  
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Introduction 
This article examines both the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and 
2008, looking at their success individually and comparing the changes made as a 
result of the saviour sibling techniques. By examining not only the legislation, but also 
religious and ethical aspects of such medical practices, the article seeks to explore 
the many viewpoints in such a controversial and morally uncertain area, and the 
difficulty in legislating when a general public consensus does not exist. 
 
Aristotle once advised men to tie off their left testicle to guarantee a male child.2 
Although unlikely to have actually worked, it demonstrates the need people felt even 
2,500 years ago, to have a degree of choice and control over the children they 
                                               
1
 [2003] EWCA Civ 667 
2
 Horsey, K., and Boggs, G., Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Reproducing Regulation, 
(2007, Routledge Cavendish), p.2 
Plymouth Law Review (2009) 1 
72 
 
produced. Similarly, Aldous Huxley‟s fictitious depiction in Brave New World 3 of a 
society in which children were produced on a conveyer belt of in vitro fertilisation and 
cloned to manufacture citizens for particular roles in society, reflects the notion, far 
more poignantly, that the breeding of children with the „right‟ characteristics was at 
least in the mind of society. Though this is purely fiction and not scientific prophecy, 
Huxley‟s novel plays on anxieties which remain in society today; anxieties of 
„designer-babies‟ and perfect children. 
 
It was the birth of the first in vitro baby, Louise Brown, in 1978 which really brought to 
light the need to implement some form of legislation governing embryo research and 
its technological developments. However, because of the difficulty in legislating for 
something which is so ethically controversial and socially uncertain, it took the 
government many years to bring in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990. Though this Act was much needed, it has become outdated as medicine 
advances and now has to be interpreted in the light of today‟s society and its many 
different beliefs. This was brought dramatically into focus by the case of R (on the 
Application of Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 4 which 
challenged the drafting and boundaries of the current law, questioning whether it was 
acceptable to carry out tissue typing alongside pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in 
order to save a sick sibling. There was a fear that this could be the beginning of (or a 
move towards) cherry picking the characteristics of babies. 
 
1 The History of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Legislation 
Prior to the 1990 legislation there was great „political disinclination to engage in 
debate on the sanctity of life‟, meaning that it took twelve years to implement 
legislation that was instigated in response to the development of the first in vitro 
baby.5 The difficulties came from the many different belief systems, both ethical and 
religious. For example, for a devout Roman Catholic life is considered a gift from God 
and thus is sacred and any act such as the destruction of an embryo because it may 
be genetically imperfect in medical terms, is wrong. The belief that life begins at 
conception makes any form of embryo research simply wrong and puts huge 
pressure on those who have conflicts of interest in the form of being highly religious 
but being unable to reproduce.6 It is not the handicap or the genetic disease that is 
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vetoed; but the actual child with the handicap or genetic disease which is being 
prevented. There is a difficult balance between medicine and religion and the Act, 
allowing for certain forms of fertility treatment and research, tries to find a middle 
ground. 
 
One of the most disputed issues in this area is the status of the embryo. Those 
against embryo research argue that 
„the use of a human embryo for research is morally wrong because of the 
very fact that they are human…The human embryo is seen as having the 
same status as a child or adult, by virtue of its potential for human life.7 
 
In contrast, those in favour of embryo research suggest that an embryo is simply „a 
collection of cells which, unless it implants in the human uterine environment, has no 
potential for development...‟8 In light of this, the Warnock Report considered that it 
was inappropriate to endow the embryo of the human species with the full panoply of 
human rights. However, it was also inappropriate simply to consider it as nothing 
more than a ball of cells.9 It was recommended that no live embryo, frozen or 
unfrozen, may be kept alive beyond 14 days, by which time the primitive streak will 
have appeared as the cells become more defined, and that research may only be 
carried out up until this point,10 providing the embryo with some legal protection. 
There is much case law examining the status of the embryo and both the UK and US 
courts seem to arrive at similar opinions. In the Tennessee case of Davis v Davis 
Doughtrey J concluded that „[embryos] are not, strictly speaking, either „persons‟ or 
„property‟, but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect 
because of their potential for human life.‟11 In the English case of Evans v Amicus 
Healthcare Ltd12 Lord Justice Thorpe said:  
 
„It has been repeatedly held that a foetus prior to the moment of birth does not 
have independent rights or interests. Thus...can there be no independent 
rights or interests in stored embryos. In this respect our law is not inconsistent 
with the decisions of the ECHR. Article 2 protects the right to life. No 
Convention jurisprudence extends the right to an embryo, much less to one 
which at the material point of time is non-viable.‟13  
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It is not until the embryo is born as a child that full rights are offered. 
 
In 1982 the Conservative government set up the Committee under Dame Mary 
Warnock to examine medical developments, bearing in mind social, ethical and legal 
implications, and to make recommendations regarding these developments.14 It 
quickly became clear that the differing opinions of various groups, both social and 
ethical, would create conflicts with most of the recommendations. But, as Brazier 
rightly stated,  
in medical debates there is no answer that will be accepted as unchangeably 
right. The question for legislators is not to find the right answer, to achieve a 
moral consensus, but to determine how in a liberal, democratic society, 
legislation can be formulated in the absence of such consensus.15  
 
Instead of a resolution of moral differences based on philosophical principles, which 
Warnock described as „impossible,‟ she chose „to try to assemble a coherent policy 
which might seem, if not right, then at least all right, to the largest possible number of 
people.‟16 This can be seen by the six years it took for the recommendations of the 
Warnock Report to be produced in the form of binding legislation. In the introduction 
to the Report, Dame Mary Warnock remarks that, „in recognising that there should be 
limits, people are bearing witness to the existence of a moral ideal of society.‟ The 
aim was to make recommendations based on the majority moral opinion within 
society; as sociologist Michael Mulkay has argued the Warnock position was the 
outcome of an effort to acknowledge fundamentally opposing views and find the path 
of greatest social consensus among them.17 
 
There were two major focus points of the Report which stood out; the status of the 
embryo and the importance of regulating standards; little regard was given to the 
actual processes or the techniques being considered. This could be seen as a way of 
allowing developments to occur but at the same time not allowing them to occur in a 
free-for-all kind of way - after all, the whole point was to create rules and lay down 
guidelines to be followed, not to completely prevent all medical advances. Although 
Pre-implementation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) was not developed when the Report 
was written, there are recommendations relating to potential future developments 
and how these developments should be regulated. The Warnock strategy of 
promoting scientific progress subject to strict regulation has continued to this day and 
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is still a major factor in the 2008 Act; the approach allows room for constant public 
deliberation as a method of preventing any such technologies going unregulated or 
uncontrolled.18  
 
In introducing the legislation to the House of Commons, the then Secretary of State 
for Health, Kenneth Clarke, said:  
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill is, in my opinion, one of the 
most significant measures to be brought forward by a Government in the last 
20 years. It is a complex and sensitive Bill that deals with matters that are 
fundamental to the well-being of our society.19 
 
The enactment of the 1990 Act concluded an unprecedented process of public 
consultation and Parliamentary negotiation. The Act remains the most extensive, 
substantial, and detailed legal framework ever created to regulate and govern what 
had previously been the legally unchartered territory of human fertilisation and 
embryology.20 Lord Bingham in R (on the Application of Bruno Quintavalle on behalf 
of Pro-Life Alliance) v Secretary of State for Health made clear that,  
„[the] 1990 Act was passed “to make provision in connection with human 
embryos and any subsequent development of such embryos; to prohibit 
certain practices in connection with embryos and gametes; to establish a 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority”... A power is also conferred on 
the Authority to give binding directions.‟21 
 
Although a little outdated now, the legislation which emerged in 1990 was extremely 
advanced and nothing else had been produced of such significance or caused such 
public concern and comfort simultaneously. The responsibility of legislating for things 
which were impossible to foresee would always be a daunting task. 
 
2 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
The problem with the 1990 Act lay in its inability to see far enough into the future, and 
thus regulate fully and effectively on the medical advances. It could be argued that 
vagueness is necessary when legislating for continuing developments, but it makes 
the enforcement that much more difficult, with the courts having to attempt to 
interpret whether ethically and socially difficult procedures are acceptable and legal.  
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As noted earlier, PGD and tissue typing both struggle to find a place within the Act; 
though the courts have accepted that PGD is within the scope even if it is not 
expressly mentioned. However, tissue typing is far from anything mentioned at all. 
Interpretation of the Act is the courts‟ job, but it must be questioned, with no mention 
of such specific procedures, whether the courts and more specifically the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), the Act‟s regulatory body, are actually 
interpreting the Act or beginning to create new law. This is the crux of the argument 
in R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority.22 This case involved a child with the disease beta thalasasemia major, 
who, for his survival, needed a bone marrow transplant. His parents, Mr and Mrs 
Hashmi, wanted to conceive a child who was not only free from the disease, but also 
a tissue match for their sick son. For this PGD and tissue typing would have to take 
place, and the issue in question was whether tissue typing was within the scope of 
the 1990 Act. In relation to this problem, the main areas which created ambiguity 
were sections 2(1)(d) which attempts to define „treatment services,‟ 13(5) which takes 
into account the welfare of the child, and Schedule 2 para.1(1)(d) and 1(3) which 
describes what a licence can authorise. None of the terms in these sections offer 
clear guidelines for the courts or the HFEA to follow.  
 
The Warnock Report recommended „a new statutory licensing authority to regulate 
both research and those infertility services which have been recommended should be 
subject to control‟23 (artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, egg or embryo 
donation, surrogacy, genetic testing and embryo research). This is legislated for in 
sections 5-11 of the Act which specifies the need for the HFEA, whom it shall consist 
of and how it shall be run. The HFEA itself takes responsibility for individual licensing 
decisions and oversees the workings of the statutory licensing scheme. An attempt to 
make the HFEA merely advisory to the Secretary of State was defeated,24 thus 
reinforcing the need to have a body which can actually make executive decisions. 
Schedule 1 provides that the HFEA shall be made up of both men and woman and 
that at least half of them shall be lay people. This is a really positive trait of the 
HFEA, as purely medical practitioners or purely religious practitioners could not 
necessarily be relied on to make a fair decision serving the needs of the patient or 
society as a whole. 
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However, the HFEA has an extremely large amount of power including the ability to 
decide who „deserves‟ a licence, and their decisions impact directly on the 
techniques available to patients seeking treatment for infertility: a prime example 
being the case of the Whitakers in contrast to the Hashmis, discussed below. What 
this does is provide consistency in their treatment services, creating trust in its 
practices. For the Whitakers, PGD was not needed so treatment was disallowed. It 
could be argued that such a strict, narrow interpretation of the rules would comfort 
those worried about „designer babies‟ and embryo selection going too far. The HFEA 
will never grant a licence unless is it the only possible option to prevent disease and 
for the purely medical benefit of the child who would be born as a result. In contrast, 
it has been argued that although PGD is not prohibited by the Act, the decision to 
authorise such a procedure alongside tissue typing should be left to a democratic 
decision in Parliament as this goes beyond „the mere considerations of the welfare of 
the child and [has] the potential to affect society‟s perception of human life‟.25 The 
HFEA, by making such a decision, is perhaps going beyond its powers to implement 
the 1990 Act. This point was clarified by Lord Phillips in Quintavalle stating that  
screening for embryos before implantation enables a choice to be made as to 
the characteristics of the child to be born with the assistance of the treatment. 
Whether and for what purposes such a choice should be permitted raises 
difficult ethical questions. My conclusion is that Parliament has placed that 
choice in the hands of the HFEA. 
 
This decision has given the HFEA the discretionary power to make all decisions 
which are either not covered by the Act, left unclear, or where medical research has 
overtaken the legislation, granting them an enormous amount of power. 
 
Section 11 of the 1990 Act provides restrictions on what licences can be granted by 
the HFEA and Schedule 3 broadly provides for what a licence may and may not 
authorise. Schedule 3(2)(b) allows for a licence to be granted if it appears to the 
HFEA to be „necessary or desirable for the purpose of developing methods for 
detecting the presence of gene or chromosome abnormalities in embryos before 
implantation‟. This allows for research to be done on the development of PGD should 
the HFEA choose to grant such a licence for this, although the HFEA is under no 
obligation to grant one. There is only the obligation not to permit particular types of 
licences, all the positive provisions state that the HFEA „may‟ authorise. Another 
irregularity, though an annual report is put together, is the lack of any checks over the 
HFEA itself. The Code of Practice put in place to provide guidelines about particular 
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procedures is about practices and procedures of clinics and only dedicates one small 
paragraph to the way the HFEA should behave.26 Other than this, and the broad 
provisions in the Act, there is no body to check that it does not abuse its power, as 
already seen, Lord Phillips has left all decision making to HFEA rather than handing 
unprecedented cases back to Parliament. There is the possibility of bringing a judicial 
review action, but this would not be particularly swift. It must be questioned whether a 
retrospective annual report of what the HFEA has been licensing is enough? The 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Report brought attention to 
the concern that the HFEA has exceeded its limits and is beginning to „alter statutory 
boundaries.‟ The Lawyers' Christian Fellowship (LCF) has made a number of 
allegations, arguing that „the HFEA misunderstands its functions, purports to perform 
functions that are not within the 1990 Act, and indicates that it would like to extend its 
jurisdiction even further.‟27 Though the Act does not mention the HFEA setting new 
policies, its governing role implies that decisions need to be made, thus naturally 
resulting in policies; it would be difficult to justify going back to Parliament to question 
their intention for the Act and the HFEA every time a different set of circumstances 
asked a slightly difficult set of questions. This being said, pro-life organisations, 
including CORE, Comment on Reproductive Ethics, do their upmost to keep the 
HFEA vigilant. 
 
3 Critical Analysis of the Act 
There are a number of specific problems when looking at the 1990 Act with PGD and 
tissue typing in mind. Both throw up inconsistencies and ambiguities individually and 
together. Section 2 aims to define particular terminology used throughout the Act and 
problems begin to arise immediately. Subsection (1)(d) states that „treatment 
services‟ means medical, surgical or obstetric services provided to the public or a 
section of the public for the purpose (emphasis added) of assisting women to carry 
children.‟ Is the purpose to purely assist a woman to carry a child? For example if she 
has difficulty conceiving, then the purpose of helping conception through in vitro 
fertilisation would be assisting the woman to carry a child. Or is it more specific than 
that? Could the purpose be that the woman has assistance carrying a healthy child? 
What if the purpose is to have a particular characteristic such as tissue type? The 
Oxford English dictionary defines „purpose‟ as „the reason for which something is 
done or which something exists‟ or to „have as one‟s objective.‟ Again, this is not 
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particularly helpful as it is unclear whether the purpose must be medical, social or 
personal. On the other hand, when one is seeking PGD, then this section is broad 
enough to allow for a woman to have the objective of having a healthy child by 
screening out particular hereditary diseases. Though this is probably an acceptable 
interpretation of the meaning, where to place tissue typing is less straightforward as a 
particular characteristic of an embryo does not really fulfil the meaning of purpose 
when it comes to assisting a woman to carry a child; the tissue type is pretty 
irrelevant to the process.  
 
The section which perhaps is most relevant to tissue typing and strictly followed 
through the actions of the HFEA, is section 13(5) which states that „a woman shall 
not be provided with treatment services…unless account has been taken of the 
welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment…and of any child 
who may be affected by the birth.‟ The reasons behind applying for a licence to grant 
the ability to carry out tissue typing on an embryo is to significantly improve the well 
being of another child. However, there is conflict in the way the HFEA grants a 
licence of this kind. The HFEA has positively stated in its reports that:  
 
pre-implantation tissue typing would not necessarily compromise the welfare 
of the child born a result of the procedure because there was no reason to 
suppose that such a child would necessarily suffer emotional or psychological 
harm as a result of knowing that they were conceived, at least in part, in order 
to be a tissue donor to an older sibling.28  
 
This is all well and good, but what about the welfare of the child who may not receive 
treatment because the HFEA refuse to grant a licence, for example the Whitakers, 
discussed later? If there is no apparent distress caused to the child being born, at 
least partly, for their tissue type, then how is disallowing tissue typing alone in the 
interest of „any child who might be affected by the birth‟? Can such a distinction really 
be justified when to grant the licence would be to create a life, which would be by no 
means hindered by having a particular tissue type, and to save a life?  
 
Another important part of the 1990 Act is Schedule 2 paragraph 1 which explains 
what a licence can and cannot be granted for: for example the alteration of the 
genetic structure of an embryo is prohibited.29 The most controversial and 
unintelligible part of Schedule 2 is paragraph 1(1)d) which states: „a licence under 
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this paragraph may authorise any of the following in the course of providing treatment 
services – practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition 
(emphasis added) to be placed in a woman or to determine where embryos are 
suitable for that purpose (emphasis added).‟ The first thing to note about this is the 
two different types of embryo being recognised; one being in a suitable condition and 
the other being an embryo suitable for a particular purpose, as discussed above, 
whatever that purpose may be. This appears to accommodate almost all kinds of 
embryo, including particular characteristics of the embryo, if that is the purpose of the 
mother‟s treatment services. Parliament does save itself a little here by putting in the 
word „suitable‟ which on face value could be interpreted as an embryo suitable to be 
placed in the womb in order for a child to be born, thus excluding characteristics, as a 
suitable embryo for the purpose of having a child makes characteristics irrelevant. 
But what does „suitable‟ actually mean and in medical terms, what falls under the 
term? The Oxford English Dictionary describes it as „right or appropriate for a 
particular person, purpose or situation.‟ This does not really add clarity to the 
meaning of the provision, but rather, leaves it open for interpretation. Lord Phillips 
notes in the Hashmi case that „”suitable” is not defined, but that procedures carried 
out to ascertain suitability for transfer were considered to be appropriate for 
licensing.‟30 He later goes into more detail with specific regard to PGD:  
The word „suitable‟ takes its meaning from its context. Where the object of the 
treatment is to enable a woman to bear a child confident that it will not carry a 
hereditary defect, an embryo will only be suitable for the purpose of being 
placed within her if it is free from that defect.31  
 
Unlike some other parts of the Act, this provision allows for tissue typing to find a 
place where it may fit and be an acceptable treatment service, suitable for the 
purpose of carrying a child.  
 
The final important part is Schedule 2 paragraph 1(3) which states that in order for a 
licence to be to be granted, it must appear to the HFEA „to be necessary or desirable 
(emphasis added) for the purpose of providing treatment services.‟ This is extremely 
vague as „necessary‟ and „desirable‟ have very different meanings; one conveys 
something which has to be done, the other something which is not necessary but 
would be nice. In fact the dictionary states that desirable is something „wished for as 
being attractive, useful or necessary.‟ Though necessary is part of the meaning, it is 
just one of three possible meanings for the word. It may be attractive to have a child 
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with a particular tissue type, or useful to have a child with blonde hair, but do these 
things fall within the meaning of the Act? A particular tissue type would be for a 
genuine medical reason, whereas hair colour is perhaps a parental indulgence, 
however nothing is mentioned as to which the correct interpretation is. 
 
All that being said, it is up to the HFEA to make a decision which they believe is 
reasonable and appropriate, using all their medical knowledge and treating each 
case subjectively. The Act, although it is now very outdated, was created to at least 
some extent to allow for future developments, which means that, it could be argued, 
to achieve this aim, it must remain to quite a large degree open and non-specific.  
 
4 R (o/a Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority 
 
This case is so important because it widens the meaning of Schedule 2 paragraph 
1(1)(d). The implication of this widening was that the accessibility to fertility treatment 
for the purpose of being able to help another child suffering from a serious illness 
was made possible rather than impossible; although the decision is not without its 
challenges. 
 
In 1992, Chloe O‟Brien, the first baby conceived through PGD was born. Both of her 
parents were carriers of cystic fibrosis and therefore had a 1:4 chance of any child 
born naturally contracting the disease. This resulted in the Human Genetics 
Commission releasing a statement explaining that:  
PGD is currently being offered for three major categories of disease, including 
i) to determine the sex of the embryo to avoid sex-linked disorders..., ii) to 
identify embryos with single gene disorders... and iii) to identify embryos with 
chromosomal disorders.32  
 
This description implies that the „designer baby‟ tag given to many PGD born children 
is simply inaccurate. Chloe O‟Brian was not „designed‟ by her parents. Rather, she 
was selected from a number of candidates, but nothing at all was done to alter her 
genetic composition.33 Then in 2002, in the USA, a baby boy named Adam was 
conceived, again using PGD to test for Fanconi‟s anaemia, but this time the embryos 
were also tested for a matching tissue type to his sister, Molly. There was surprisingly 
little criticism of the parents, however, Kevin Male, on behalf of the anti-abortion 
group Life, commented, „in essence it is about people being killed to get the child you 
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want.‟34 This seems a little misguided as to the actual procedure and reasons behind 
undergoing PGD, particularly alongside tissue typing. No people are „killed‟ and 
embryos which are discarded for PGD may well be discarded in the use of in vitro 
fertilisation, regardless of their health. A patient who has gone through PGD 
poignantly commented,  
it‟s how you approach the word “choice”... [PGD] gives you the choice of 
healthy from unhealthy, as opposed to choosing...a blonde or brunette, or a 
boy or a girl. This is a choice out of necessity, not for any other reason.35  
 
The authority granted a licence for the procedure of PGD and tissue typing to be 
carried out in order to save Mr and Mrs Hashmi‟s son Zain, however the claimant, 
Mrs Quintavalle, acting for CORE, sought judicial review that the granting of such a 
licence was outside the scope of the 1990 Act for the purpose of selecting between 
healthy embryos using tissue typing. The Authority contended that the treatment was 
for the purposes of allowing a woman to carry a child under section 2(1) of the Act, 
and that the biopsy to establish the tissue type of the embryo was to ensure it was in 
a „suitable condition to be placed in a woman or to determine whether the embryo 
was suitable for that purpose‟ under paragraph 1(1)(d) of Schedule 2. It was finally 
held that the Authority was within its rights to grant a licence for the purposes of 
tissue typing alongside PGD and was within the scope of the Act. 
 
When considering the outcome of this case the judges had to find the balance 
between Parliamentary intention when writing the legislation, the needs of Mrs 
Hashmi and her family, and those with fertility difficulties in general. A purposive 
approach was taken by the judges following the approach set out by Lord Wilberforce 
in Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and 
Social Security36.  
...when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes 
into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the 
parliamentary intention.37  
 
However, he went further and clarified that:  
There is one course which the courts cannot take under the law of this 
country: they cannot fill gaps; they cannot by asking the question, 'What 
would Parliament have done in this current case, not being one in 
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contemplation, if the facts had been before it?', attempt themselves to supply 
the answer, if the answer is not to be found in the terms of the Act itself.38  
 
So the intention of Parliament must be found, for if the process of tissue typing falls 
outside the remit of the Act, it is not the place of the courts to find the answer, but for 
Parliament to decide the law.  
 
Quintavalle fought for a narrow construction of the Act and thus it was argued that 
„suitable‟ must mean for the purpose of assisting a woman to carry a healthy child, 
and that tissue typing fell outside this function. CORE contended there were other 
good reasons for accepting a narrower construction of this term: in taking account of 
the wishes of Mrs Hashmi as to a future child's particular characteristics, the HFEA's 
broader construction would pave the way for the creation of 'designer babies' chosen 
on the basis of such characteristics as hair and eye colour.39 Lord Phillips submitted 
that  
[the] screening of embryos before implantation enables a choice to be made 
as to the characteristics of the child to be born with the assistance of the 
treatment. Whether and for what purposes such a choice should be permitted 
raises difficult ethical questions. My conclusion is that Parliament has placed 
that choice in the hands of the HFEA.40  
 
The deliberate placement of such decisions in the hands of the HFEA can allow for a 
subjective assessment of each case to decide whether the candidates fall into the 
strict conditions placed on the treatment of tissue typing, and thus the potential of 
embryo choice coming down to personal taste for particular characteristics is well 
safeguarded. In fact, some cases decided upon by the HFEA have been criticised as 
being too harsh. The potential for a licence being granted by the HFEA for social 
reasons is near impossible. This was clarified by Schiemann:  
 
Parliament did not impose upon the Authority any express obligation to 
sanction the grant of licences even if what was proposed was indubitably 
necessary for the purpose of assisting a woman to carry a child... If the 
decision of the Authority is upheld in the present case it does not mean that 
parents have a right to in vitro fertilisation for social selection purposes.41 
 
One of the main objections to saviour siblings is an extension of a further concern 
surrounding the use of PGD in general, that a child conceived in this way is not 
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valued for itself but upon the condition that certain characteristics exist. Many ethical 
arguments against tissue typing, whether used in conjunction with PGD or alone, cite 
Immanuel Kant‟s dictum that one should „never use people solely as a means but 
always treat them as an end.‟42 On this issue, Mance LJ looks at the legislation in a 
wider sense rather than a narrow reading of the specific sections.  
To see the legislation as interested only in women‟s ability successfully to 
experience the physical process of pregnancy and birth would seem to me to 
invert the significance of the human wish to reproduce. Just as „placing an 
embryo in a woman‟ is only a first step towards a successful pregnancy, so 
pregnancy and the experience of birth are steps towards an expanded family 
life, not an end in themselves.43  
 
The view here is that the birth of the child, for whatever reason, does not depend on 
characteristics but is a way of having a fulfilling family life, and treating the birth as an 
end would hinder the bigger picture of having a child; not to see it as a woman‟s right 
to have a child, but to place value on its being as a member of a family, of a society. 
The Act was considered in a very broad sense, taking note of the father and the 
needs of the future child or sibling who may be affected. In opting for a broad 
construction of the statute, which is protective of the discretion exercised by the 
HFEA, the court here takes a clear view that the purpose of establishing a regulatory 
body was to allow it to reach informed and timely judgements in the light of the best 
available medical science as new technologies develop.44 
 
The Quintavalle challenge demonstrated that the Law Lords were content to entrust 
the HFEA with the responsibility of ensuring PGD is only used in „appropriate‟ 
circumstances. The manner in which this task is being carried out has been cast into 
doubt by the apparent ethical confusion underlying the conditions attached to the 
decision about tissue typing.45 This was really emphasised by the case of Charlie 
Whitaker. 
 
The strict controls set out by the HFEA to govern the use of PGD with tissue typing 
were to be used on a case by case basis and decide that a) the condition of the 
affected child should be severe or life threatening, of a sufficient seriousness to 
justify the use of PGD; b) the embryos conceived in the course of this treatment 
should themselves be at risk from the condition; and c) all other possibilities of 
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treatment and sources of tissue for the affected child should have been explored;46 
along with five others which are not relevant here. The Whitakers applied for the 
same licence as the Hashmis to try to cure their son, Charlie, who suffered from 
Diamond Blackfan anaemia (BDA). However, there was one critical different which 
would prevent the HFEA granting them a licence; BDA is not a genetic disease, it 
occurs sporadically, and the chance of the Whitakers having another child at risk 
from the disease was extremely slim. This meant that they failed part b) of the criteria 
to qualify for the treatment. 
 
It must be noted that the HFEA have set themselves guidelines which they are 
keeping to and this creates a sense of certainty, particularly for those worried about 
the birth of the „designer baby.‟ As with many of the decisions regarding embryology, 
there is a difficult balancing act to be considered between what is right for a single 
case and what is right in the light of emerging technologies.  
 
In November 2001 the HFEA‟s Ethics Committee put together a number of 
recommendations regarding tissue typing in conjunction with PGD. At paragraph 3.14 
it was stated that where a licence is sought for the treatment of PGD with tissue 
typing on an embryo which is not at serious risk of a hereditary disease the treatment 
„should also be available where there is an existing sibling with a life-threatening but 
non-inherited condition.‟47 In 2002 by denying the treatment, the HFEA specifically 
acted against the recommendations of its own Ethics Committee. The apparent 
justifications for this refusal, that the Whitakers were testing the tissue of the embryo 
exclusively for the benefit of another party, and that the future child‟s welfare might 
be compromised by the psychological burden of being an “engineered” match for a 
sibling seem somewhat implausible. The HFEA‟s (then) Director of Communications 
explained:  
… if you are carrying out a procedure to prevent a child being born with a 
serious illness then … one could say that the benefits outweigh the risks... 
But when you get to PGD solely for the purpose of tissue typing … strictly 
from the point of view of the physical well-being of that child, you cannot say 
that it is for its benefit, you may even be doing something which is [harmful].48 
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Even so, there was nothing actually in the law to stop the HFEA deciding in favour of 
the Whitakers. 
 
In contrast to the statement made by the Director of Communications, the 
consultation document Sex selection: choice and responsibility in human 
reproduction noted that the health risks which might cause an embryo, which has 
undergone testing involving the removal of a single cell for biopsy, not to develop 
would never be placed into the womb, and therefore there is no reason to believe 
that there is an increased health risk to a child following this technique. Any embryos 
not damaged during biopsy should go on to develop normally.49 This document was 
released a mere two months after the Whitaker decision. The argument behind the 
decision simply does not stand against such contradicting decisions and statements. 
 
The 1990 Act was created to be in line with the Abortion Act 1967 and its guidance 
on selective abortion. However, there were some distinctions which have caused 
great concern among many; this was particularly emphasised when Jayson Whitaker 
gave oral evidence to the Science and Technology Committee.  
When we first suggested PGD to our consultant, we were told, 'You can't do 
that here but what you can do is get pregnant, you can have amniocentesis, 
you can have a test and then you can terminate'… The human and emotional 
and ethical cost for my wife of being pregnant, carrying a child and then 
terminating was the unethical question. That was actually suggested to us as 
an alternative, a legal NHS approved alternative that could be done here.50  
 
Others have expressed concern over the difference in wording; to undergo PGD 
there must be „serious‟ risk to the child, but to have selective abortion up to the 24th 
week of pregnancy, there must be „substantial‟ risk the child will have an 
abnormality.51 The difference in wording is offered no explanation. John Harris 
expressed the view that PGD and selective abortion should not be afforded the same 
criteria:  
[The] comparison is seriously misleading if not fallacious... A decision to 
abort…must be endorsed by two medical practitioners and comply with 
various Acts of Parliament…A decision not to implant an embryo requires no 
legal justification whatsoever.52  
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Though this may be true, it is a little obtuse to the long process of obtaining a licence 
to have pre-implantation testing carried out at all. As optimistic as the decision to twin 
PGD guidelines with selective abortion guidelines was, as with much of the 1990 Act, 
it is not without its contradictions and difficulties. 
  
Is the Act sufficient to cover such a situation? 
Although the courts did construe the 1990 Act to include the practice of tissue typing, 
it was a stretch from the original wording of the Act and the intention of Parliament 
had to be considered. This implies that should medical technologies develop much 
further the courts would really struggle to interpret them in light of the old law. 
Margaret Brazier noted that there is „little conceptual depth underpinning British Law‟ 
thus resulting in repeated debates of „the same issues in different guises,‟53 which 
can be seen by the conflicting decisions of the HFEA. 
 
It is also a concern to some that the HFEA have power beyond what was intended in 
the 1990 Act, whether it was intended that they should have the power to decide 
whether it is either „necessary‟ or „desirable,‟54 although it was confirmed in the 
Quintavalle case that they should have such power, and that this was Parliament‟s 
intention: „Whether and for what purposes [a choice to create a saviour sibling] 
should be permitted raises difficult ethical questions. My conclusion is that Parliament 
has placed that choice in the hands of the HFEA.‟55 On the other hand, it is probably 
fair to question how far these decision making powers go, particularly in light of 
developing technologies. A major conflict is that the courts cannot create new law 
and the old 1990 Act cannot keep up with the new developments. 
 
One of the most difficult tasks Parliament has is to legislate on issues which are 
continually evolving, with massive moral and ethical implications attached. Many of 
the ethical objections attached to PGD are rooted in a general concern for the moral 
status of the human embryo and the misuse of these technologies. The „designer 
baby‟ phenomenon is all a question of medical limits, of how far science should go 
and how society will be protected against the possibility of biomedicine „going too 
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far‟.56 Selecting and discarding embryos, or „playing God‟ is no different than that 
which is done in routine IVF, choosing the most likely to implant in the womb.57  
 
Josephine Quintavalle believes that the commoditisation of children in reproductive 
technology is turning parenthood into an unhealthy model of self-gratification rather 
than a relationship where unequivocal acceptance and love of the offspring is the 
primary focus.58 This seems a little ignorant to the reasons people choose to go 
through PGD; to prevent future pain and suffering in a child, to eradicate a hereditary 
disease, to save another child‟s life. None of the reasons parents choose to go 
through the procedure is for „self-gratification‟ or because the parents are biologically 
materialistic. Given the limited availability, expense and low success rate of PGD, 
along with the lengthy and invasive nature of IVF, it is highly unlikely that there will 
ever be much demand from individuals wanting to use the techniques for „trivial‟ 
reasons.59 
 
5 A Need for Reform? The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008 
As has been demonstrated, there are many aspects in the law regarding PGD and 
tissue typing which are insufficient today. Many of the terms are ambiguous to allow 
for developments in medicine, but are actually more of a hindrance than a help: 
having to spend time trying to interpret developments in light of the old Act adds 
unnecessary time to what is already a lengthy treatment process. Although many of 
the underlying principles of the 1990 Act remain, „the Government‟s aim in 
undertaking its review was to ensure that the law and regulation remained effective 
and fit for purpose given the pace of scientific developments and public attitudes 
associated with them.‟60 There were three main aims behind the new legislation:  
to ensure that legitimate medical and scientific applications of human 
reproductive technologies can continue to flourish, to promote public 
confidence in the development and use of human reproductive technologies 
through effective regulatory controls applicable to them, and to secure that 
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regulatory controls accord with better regulation principles and encourage 
best regulatory practice.61  
 
It must be questioned whether the 2008 Act has fulfilled these aims, and will it 
continue to be effective, or as with the 1990 Act, is it more than likely that in the next 
15 years or so, the legislation will have to be reviewed once again? What is really 
required is clarity, consistency and a clear path for access to treatment. Since the 
consultation documents on the necessary changes and improvements to the old 
1990 Act, the draft bill of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 was put 
together and given Royal Assent in November 2008. It will be implemented in stages 
between April 2009 and April 2010. 
 
In the original Act there were many difficulties over the meaning of „treatment 
services‟ under section 2(1)(d), however, there has been no change under the 2008 
Act  to the meaning and therefore the courts will still have to interpret the intention of 
Parliament when deciding whether new medicines are „for the purpose of assisting 
women to carry children.‟ There could be a number of explanations for this. It could 
be that due to the case law surrounding the meaning of „treatment services‟ and the 
final interpretation by the House of Lords was considered a sufficient interpretation to 
set precedent and for those concerned to rely upon. Leaving the meaning a little 
ambiguous also allows for further interpretation in light of any new developments 
which may arise: after all, the whole point of this kind of legislation is to try to make it 
as effective as possible for as long as possible. 
 
Under section 3 prohibitions have been placed upon the use and research of 
embryos followed by the insertion of section 3ZA to clarify the meaning of „permitted 
eggs, permitted sperm and permitted embryos.‟ Unlike the 1990 Act, there is more 
clarification of what is meant by some of the terms used, although it is still not 
perfect. „A permitted egg is one whose nuclear or mitochondrial DNA has not been 
altered‟62 which provides comfort to those who worry about designer babies, but may 
have a slightly more preventative implication. Gene therapy is the introduction of 
genetic material into cells to bring about a therapeutic effect63 and can be used to 
eradicate disease by replacing the damaged cells or carrying out a function which the 
patient‟s own genetic material cannot achieve. There are a few ways in which this 
can be carried out, one of which is called germ-line gene therapy, and involves 
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inserting the genetic material into an embryo which is „pre-emptive treatment of the 
future being of the child.‟64 If section 3ZA(2)(b) were to be narrowly construed, it 
could potentially rule out this kind of treatment as it involved the modification of the 
genetic structure. Although gene therapy is not a common procedure, it is permitted 
by way of the Council of Europe‟s Recommendation 1100 on the use of human 
embryos and foetuses for the purposes of scientific research (1989), which allows for 
gene cell manipulation if it is for therapeutic purposes. It must therefore be 
questioned whether the narrow interpretation of this section could be regarded as a 
breach of EC law. 
 
Another important addition is section 3ZA(5)(b) which states that  
regulations may provide that an embryo can be a permitted embryo, even 
though the egg or embryo has had applied to it in prescribed circumstances a 
prescribed process designed to prevent the transmission of serious 
mitochondrial disease.  
 
This in itself could cause many difficulties. What is meant by a „prescribed process‟ is 
not at all clear within the Act; all that is said is that „”prescribed” means prescribed by 
regulations‟ which according to section 45 of the 1990 Act, and amended by section 
30 of the 2008 Act, is the power for either the Secretary of State for Health or the 
HFEA to make regulations as they see fit. It was said by Mr Streeter in the House of 
Commons debate that section 3ZA(5) „is a loophole, probably unintended, but a 
loophole nonetheless. It could end in permitting the kind of reproductive cloning or 
genetic manipulation that the Government have rightly set their face against.‟65 
Though such practices have been made a criminal offence, this clause is ambiguous 
and creates uncertainty in the legislation; the basic law is in statute, but there may be 
many regulations brought in over time by either party. It can be concluded that 
because of section 3ZA(2)(b) which does not allow for DNA alteration, procedures 
such as PGD and tissue typing to eradicate disease would fall under this section 
along with any future developments with the same aims. 
 
An important clause in the 1990 Act was Schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) which made 
provisions for a licence being authorised in the course of providing treatment services 
„[other] practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be 
placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that purpose‟, 
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the latter part of the section causing most difficulty. In the 2008 Act Parliament has 
decided to omit the words „or determine whether embryos are suitable for that 
purpose.‟ This gives the phrase a much wider meaning as the embryo must be 
suitable to be placed in a woman, but the need to decide whether the embryo is 
„suitable for that purpose‟ is no longer necessary and thus the purpose of the embryo 
being placed in the woman could be that of tissue compatibility for a saviour sibling 
child. The widening of this provision does not sit well with CORE, who believe that 
the new Act has a too liberal approach stating,  
the extension of the use of embryo diagnosis to create matching embryos for 
therapeutic purposes [is] moving way beyond the original focus on cord blood 
stem cells, to now include generically any tissue from the designed baby. 
How long until this includes 'designer' kidneys and other body parts?66 
 
The other element which caused much discussion was Schedule 2 paragraph 1(3) 
that activities licensed by the Authority must be „necessary or desirable for the 
purposes of providing treatment services.‟ This phrase remains unchanged, but 
interpretation of it has been made a little easier by the consideration in the Hashmi 
case. 
 
Unlike the 1990 Act, the new Act does specifically refer to treatments such as tissue 
typing and PGD. Schedule 2 paragraph 1ZA is specifically about embryo testing and 
paragraph 1ZB is about sex selection, both of which allow for PGD and tissue typing 
where there is particular risk to the embryo. What paragraph 1ZA does is put into 
statute form the conditions set out for undergoing PGD. 1ZA(1)(a)-(c) deals with PGD 
in general terms; that a licence will be granted to test for embryo abnormalities where 
there is particular risk that the embryo may contain the abnormalities and the 
resulting child is at risk of developing a serious medical condition. 1ZA(1)(d)-(e) 
actually puts the saviour sibling procedure of tissue typing alongside PGD into 
legislation: a licence cannot authorise the testing of an embryo unless,  
in a case where a person (“the sibling”)…suffers from a serious medical 
condition which could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone 
marrow or other tissue of any resulting child, establishing whether the tissue 
of any resulting child would be compatible with that of the sibling.  
 
Sub-paragraph 2 makes things a little less clear however. It states that a licence 
under paragraph 1 cannot authorise the testing of embryos for the purpose of sub-
paragraph (1)(b) (PGD) unless there is particular risk of the abnormality and there is 
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significant risk that the person with the abnormality will develop a serious medical 
condition.67 So, in order for PGD to be carried out it appears that the embryo 
undergoing the treatment must be at risk of contracting a serious disease and this 
appears to exclude PGD for the purpose of tissue typing when there is no serious 
risk to the embryo being tested because the disease being cured is not one which is 
hereditary, but one which occurs sporadically; situations which are similar to the 
Whitakers. Although the remit of this section needs to be tested by case law, a strict 
interpretation of the Act may leave many couples much like the Whitakers having to 
seek treatment elsewhere.68 
 
Paragraph 1ZB allows for sex selection only where there is a genuine medical 
reason. 1ZB(3) allows for practices designed to secure that the resulting child will be 
of a particular sex where there is particular risk of a gender-related disability or 
illness. It leads to the question of what is meant by „serious‟? Who should decide 
what it means? What is considered serious to one may be only minor to another. The 
Oxford dictionary describes „serious‟ as „significant or worrying in terms of danger or 
risk‟. This is helpful in some respects as the potential to be born deaf, for example, is 
not a life threatening danger to the child in contrast to a disease such as beta 
thalassaemia major which requires daily blood transfusions to stay alive. But again, 
there is still a question of interpretation of degree on what one person might consider 
significant risk. An example of the different perceptions of „serious‟ medical 
conditions, albeit controversial, is the deliberate conception of a deaf child. In 2002 
Sharon Duchesneau and Candy McCullough, who were both deaf, used sperm 
donated by a friend with hereditary deafness to have a deaf baby. They took the view 
that deafness was not a disability but a difference; Sharon Duchesneau said: „It 
would be nice to have a deaf child who is the same as us…A hearing baby would be 
a blessing. A deaf baby would be a special blessing.‟69 This procedure took place in 
America and would not be allowed under English law, but it demonstrates the striking 
difference in peoples perception of what is considered a disorder which should be 
prevented and a characteristic which just makes a person different. There are some 
straightforward decisions of serious illness, where the child will die soon after birth 
without massive amounts of medical attention, but disorders which set in later in life, 
such as Parkinson‟s, is a grey area and currently untested in the law.  
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The final addition to the 2008 Act which may be of some concern is Schedule 2 
paragraph 1ZC which contains the power to amend paragraph 1ZA and 1ZB. Any 
amendment to the paragraphs and their sub-paragraphs may be made by regulations 
should the Secretary of State feel it necessary or expedient.70 Although sex selection 
on social grounds is prohibited from being introduced, the potential of this provision is 
extremely wide and how far this could go is undefined. There is no process for how 
an amendment or a decision to amend may take place; it appears that it just can as 
long as the Secretary of State deems it necessary. CORE has commented on the 
problems with this kind of legislation:  
Over and over in the Bill one notes prohibitions, but they are a usually 
qualified with a subsequent exception clause which gives power to amend, 
either by adding to or repealing, simply through extended regulations. 'No but 
yes but' law of the most devious kind.71 
 
Only time will tell whether this provision will be a dangerous addition to the 2008 Act. 
 
Are the changes sufficient? 
On introducing the Bill to the House of Commons, Dawn Primarolo said: 
This Bill will allow legitimate medical and scientific use of human reproductive 
technologies for research to flourish in this country, while giving the public 
confidence that they are being used and developed sensibly with appropriate 
controls in place. I believe this Bill will provide clarity and assurance to 
patients, researchers, the medical profession, and the public for years to 
come.72  
 
This strong statement creates the same feeling of security and belief in the new Act 
as the 1990 Act did.  Although the 2008 Act is far more modern and up-to-date than 
the 1990 one, medical technologies are advancing at an increasing rate. The time it 
will take for the legislation to be once again overtaken by technology is unknown, but 
it will not be all that long before the courts have to interpret the Act in light of new 
developments, and find places for technologies which were not even heard of when 
this Act was passed. It is more than likely that in another fifteen years, the legislation 
will again have to undergo a major review.  
 
The forthcoming changes will have a huge amount of positive attributes. Access to 
life saving treatments such as PGD and tissue typing for „saviour sibling‟ procedures 
will be licensed without the worry of a law suit. The scope of the Act being so much 
                                               
70
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s.1ZC(2). 
71
 „New Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill ,‟Comment on Reproductive Ethics. 
72




Plymouth Law Review (2009) 1 
94 
 
wider allows room for new advances to find a place and on the whole provides more 
clarity without all the ambiguous terminology. As it stands the scope of the Act is as 
wide as one interprets upon reading, therefore, to really test its limits it will be up to 
the courts to interpret just how far some of the provisions can go.  
 
Conclusion 
From the birth of Louise Brown in 1978 it was clear that legislation on fertilisation and 
embryology would be vital to society. The Warnock Report and the White Paper 
aimed to deal with the conflicts that paralleled the developments and temper the 
growing concern over the „designer baby‟ phenomenon, by trying to reach some form 
of consensus among the parties. Legislating on developing practices is always going 
to be problematic and this is reflected in the ambiguous and opaque legislation that 
emerged in 1990 as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Technologies soon 
overtook the immediate scope of the legislation and required interpretation by the 
courts, brought sharply into focus by R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act which widened the scope of the Act to include pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis and tissue typing. To reconcile the difficulties with the 
1990 Act, Parliament created the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, 
which aims to amend and modernise the old Act to be in line with today‟s medical 
technologies.  
 
All that being said, Parliament is never going to escape the difficulty of legislating on 
ethical issues with moral implications, just as the courts are always going to have to 
interpret any legislation upon the emergence of new techniques; creating law that 
can see into the future is simply impracticable. What there is today though is a 
combination of legislative and regulatory rules in the form of the 1990 and 2008 Acts 
and HFEA guidelines, along with strong precedent case law, creating a uniquely 
robust-but-flexible system.73 It is the flexibility of the Acts that has allowed for saviour 
sibling techniques to find a place within them and which will hopefully continue to 
allow for other such life saving technologies to find a place in the future. There is no 
way of knowing whether the 2008 Act will last any longer than the 1990 one, or the 
scope to which it will go; interpretation of the intention of Parliament on creating the 
Act will be up to the courts and only time will tell what they will decide.  
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